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UNANNOUNCED ENTRY TO SEARCH: THE LAW AND THE 'No-
KNOCK' BILL (S. 3246)
At common law, and under present federal and state statutes, police
officers must announce their identity and intent to enter before
conducting a search of an occupied dwelling with or without a warrant.
This rule has come under much criticism from persons urging stricter
law enforcement, particularly of narcotic laws. They argue that prior
notice allows suspects to dispose of evidence sought and thus to frustrate
the police officers' search. In response to this criticism, the Ninety-first
Congress considered legislation which would permit forceful entry by
police officers, without prior announcement of purpose and authority,
under certain specified circumstances. The legislation, popularly called
the "no-knock" bill, is widely considered to represent a change in
presently existing law on such forceful entries. This depends really on the
liberality with which courts construe the bill's provisions. As will be seen
in this review of the present law governing announcement prior to entry
to search, literal judicial interpretation of the legislation may well
impose more stringent controls on the power of police officers to enter
unannounced, rather than expand it as intended.
Senate Bill S. 3246, officially entitled the "Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act," was overwhelmingly approved by the United States
Senate and sent to the House of Representatives for approval in
February of this year.' The legislation, in part, sharply reduces penalties
for drug users, expands the Attorney General's responsibilities for drug
traffic control and law enforcement, and establishes a special search
warrant to permit forceful entry by police officers without prior
announcement of authority and purpose. The latter, Section 702,
provides:
(b) Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant relating to
offenses involving controlled dangerous substances the penalty for which
is imprisonment for more than one year may, without notice of his
authority and purpose, break open an outer or inner door or window of a
building, or any part of the building, or anything therein, if the judge or
United States magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is
probable cause to believe that (A) the property sought may, and if such
I The vote in the Senate was 82 to 0. See generally Senate Drug Bill Alters Penalties, Authorizes
Federal Marijuana Study, 6 CRiIM. L. REP. 2321 (1970).
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notice is given, will be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or (B)
the giving of such notice will immediately endanger the life or safety of the
executing officer or another person, and has included in the warrant a
direction that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such
notice: Provided, That any officer acting under such warrant, shall, as
soon as practicable after entering the premises, identify himself and give
the reasons and authority for his entrance upon the premises.2
The purpose of this provision, as stated in the Senate debates, is to
deprive potential defendants of an early warning of police intrusion, if
that warning might facilitate the quick disposal of contraband under
their control.
I. ANNOUNCEMENT-BEFORE- ENTRY LEGISLATION: HISTORY AND
PURPOSE
The proposed "no-knock" section must be viewed against the
background of the pre-existing statutory and common law it seeks t6
change. Statutory provisions requiring an announcement of identity and
purpose by police officers before a forceful entry to arrest or search, with
or without a warrant, were enacted in the great majority of states, and on
the federal level as well, during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
These statutes represented, for the most part, codifications of a long-
standing common law rule derived from Semayne's Case,' decided in
1603; rudiments of the rule established in that case were imposed on law
officers as early as the twelfth century6 Case law interpretations of prior
statutory codifications of the common law rule can, and probably will,
serve as guidelines for interpretation and construction of Section 702.
With only one exception,7 the announcement statutes on both the state
and federal level are stated in absolute terms, providing no exceptions;8
2. S. 3246,91stCong., 2dSess. § 702 (1970).
3. For a critical appraisal of the Senate's deliberations on S. 3246, see Krause, No-Knocking the
Constitution, Rolling Stone, March 19, 1970, at 23, col. 1.
4. See generally Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United
States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 560 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BLAKEY]. But
see, e.g., .Condra v. Anderson, 254 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Strader v. Commonwealth,
302 Ky. 330, 194 S.W.2d 368 (1946).
5. [T]he sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to
do other execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he
ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make a request to open the doors. 5 Co. Rep. 91a,
91b, II E.R.C. 629,77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603); cf. Deuteronomy 24:10.
6. BLAKEY at501.
7. N.Y. CODE CRIM1. PROC. tit. 2, § 799 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
8. E.g., MICH. ANN. STAT. § 28.880 (1954); OKLA. ANN. STAT. tit. 22, § 194 (1969).
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they define neither what constitutes adequate notice nor what degree of
force constitutes a "breaking. "9 For example, the current federal
statute, Section 3109, provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door . . to execute a
search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in
the execution of the warrant."
The absence of explicit definitions in such statutes, together with the
recurrent use of the motion to suppress evidence as a means of enforcing
the announcement requirement, has required courts to interpret and
refine the statutory language with great particularity."
For example, "break open" as a condition precedent to an
announcement has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sabbath v.
United States2 to involve some physical force, albeit slight, similar to
that required to commit a common law burglary. 3 Thus, "lifting a
latch, turning a doorknob, unhooking a chain or hasp . . . or pushing
open a closed door of entrance to the house-even a closed screen door
I . . is a breaking. . ."" At least one federal court has held that any
entry without permission is a breaking, 5 but a majority of decisions on
the question have held that entry through an open door or window is not
a breaking requiring prior notice to the occupants of the building.8 The
9 Cf Hadley v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888 (Ind.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
10 18 US.C, § 3109 (1958).
11 See, eg Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 916 (1969); Wittner v. United States, 406 F.2d
1165 (5th Cir. 1968); Garza-Fuentes v. United States, 400 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
963 (1%8). United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Ramos, 380 F.2d
717 (2d Cir. 1967); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Painter, 368 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1966)
United States ex rel. Manduchi v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965);
Dickey v United States, 332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 948 (1964); Polk v. United
States, 314 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 375 U.S. 844 (1963); Cognetta v. United States, 313
F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903
(1963). United States v. Burruss, 306 F. Supp. 915 (E. D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Perkins, 286 F.
Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1968); United States ex rel. Carafas v. LaVallee, 275 F. Supp. 91 (N.D.N.Y.
1966); United States v. St. Clair, 240 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
12 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
13 See, eg., Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Peoplev. Rosales, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1,
437 P 2d 489,492 (1968); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 798,806 (1924).
14. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 798,806 (1924); cf. Munoz v. United
States, 325 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1963). Contra Williams v. Unites States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir- 1959);
United States v. Bowman, 137 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1956).
15 Hair v. United States. 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
16 Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); People v. Rosales, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1,437 P.2d
489 (1968) But cf. Hadley v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888 (Ind.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1968).
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applicability of the statutory announcement requirement can depend,
therefore, on whether a police officer is thin enough to squeeze through a
partially open door,17 or jumps over a garden gate rather than opening
it,"s or, presumably, pushes aside draped beads rather than waiting for
the occupant to hold them aside for him. 9 Undoubtedly, this
construction can be difficult for a police officer to understand and to
comply with.2 The only assured course of conduct for an executing
officer seems to be to give an announcement under all circumstances; to
this extent, the number of legal, yet silent, entries by the police is limited
substantially.21
Likewise the precise form of the required announcement has been
interpreted with varying strictness0 Although the common law did not
establish a "precise form of words," z most decisions have required
officers to announce more than just their identity!3' At the very least, it
would seem that police must knock or call out, identify themselves, and
request admittance for the purpose of searching.2 5 But a major stumbling
17. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dyton v. Ellingsworth, 306 F. Supp. 231,236 (D.C. Del. 1969)
(pushing open a door already 6-8 inches ajar); United States v. Ramos, 380 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967)
(pushing open partially closed door while occupant resisted). Where, however, the door is opened by
the occupant, the entry is not forceful. Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 916, 919 (1969); Dickey v.
United States, 332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 379 U.S. 948 (1964); Keiningham v. United
States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
18. Cf. Wittner v. United States, 406 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1968); Sabbath v. United States, 391
U.S. 585 (1968).
19. Cf. United States v. Burruss, 306 F. Supp. 915,920 (E.l. Pa. 1969).
20. The highest frequency of violation by the police of announcement requirements apparently
does occur in gambling and narcotics cases. See Hadley v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888, 900 (Ind.)
(Lewis, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
21. The overall effect on police activity has not gone unnoticed. The following recommendations
on prior announcement by the police in drug searches appears in a legal manual published, it says,
for members of the "movement":
If you have drugs in the house always keep your door locked and ask who it is before you
open it. If they say it is the police, ask them if they have a warrant. If they say no, don't open
the door. If they say yes, ask them to slip the warrant under the door. . .They might slip it
under or they might just bust down the door; they might butt it in even if they don't have a
warrant. But the harder you make it for them to get in, the more tite you have to get rid of
the dope.
K. BOUDIN, B. GLICK, E. RASKIN & G. REICHBACH, THE BUST BOOK-WHAT TO DO UNTIL THE
LAWYER COMES 31-2 (1970).
22. Compare Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) with United States v. Freeman, 144 F.
Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1956).
23. Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (K.B. 1757).
24. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); accord, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471,484 (1963). But Cf., United States ex rel. Dyton v. Ellingsworth, 306 F. Supp. 231, 236 (D.C.
Del. 1969).
25. E.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Work v. United Staes, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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block for effective searches, at least in narcotics and gambling cases, is
not primarily compliance with this form of notice; rather it is the delay it
entails and the advance alert it guarantees a suspect.
In this regard, most announcement statutes expressly require both an
announcement and a refusal of admittance. 2 While the refusal of
admittance need not be an affirmative gesture by occupants believed
inside the dwelling, there must be a knocking and announcement, and
the officer must wait a reasonable amount of time for a reply before he
can interpret the silence to be a refusal.7 Clearly, a "reasonable" delay
as a standard for performance is at best amgibuous for police, and
invites unintended, technical non-compliance with the demands of the
statute. Moreover, decisions under this condition of the announcement
statutes fail to pin down any minimum. The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has approved a delay of only three or four seconds before the breaking;"
but the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has suggested as a general
guideline a few minutes (and has proposed that executing officers might
time with a stopwatch the amount of time delayed-to establish a clearer
record for appeals)." To complicate matters further for law officers, the
courts have held that the absence of occupants in a dwelling excuses all
announcements, but that lack of a response to knocking (without an
announcement of identity) is insufficient to raise an inference that no one
is inside?0
Hypothetically, it must seem ludicrous to a narcotics agent that he
must stand outside a screened porch connected with a home's main
entrance; yell out his identity as a plainclothes narcotics agent and his
intent to enter and search; request admission, and then wait a few
minutes for the occupant to refuse to open the door?' Although this
26 Eg., IND ANN. STAT. § 9-1001 (1956). But see CAL. PEN. CODE § 844 (Deering 1956).
27. E g , United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1968); United States EX rel.
Manduchi v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); Masiello v. United
States. 317 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
28. McClure v. United States, 332 F.2d 19 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 380 U.S. 945 (1964) (heard
footsteps), cf. United States v. Aldrete, 414 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1969) (15 seconds); United States v.
Harris, 391 F.2d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1968) (delay ignored on appeal). But see Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
29 United States ex tel. Ametrane %. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1967); cf. e.g.,
Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
30 Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 926 (1957); cf. Wong
Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)g Good man v. State, 178 Md. 1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940);
Jones v State, 4 Ala. App. 159, 58 So. 1011 (1912). Contra People v. Baca, 197 Cal. App.2d 362, 17
Cal Rptr. 204 (1961); cf. Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
948 (1959).
31. See Hadley v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888, 903-11 (Ind.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012
Vol. 1970: 205]
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states an extreme situation, it is not implausible; such complex, technical
interpretations of the prior announcement statutes impose significant
limitations on the power of the police to enter a building or curtilage to
search by surprise.
The divergent views on the interpretation of the "breaking" element
and on the required form of the notice and refusal of admittance
probably stem from a more fundamental disagreement over the basic
rationale for requiring prior notice by police officers. Semayne's Case
asserted that the rule was to prevent unnecessary property damage from
the breaking where, had a demand for entry been made, the door would
have been opened3 However, the vast number of common law and
statutory decisions in the United States have mechanically enforced the
rule, explaining its imposition only as traditionally fair procedure?3 Why
notice before entry is "fair" when notice serves primarily to alert
occupants that contraband should be destroyed, as in narcotics cases, is
not clear. The Supreme Court decisions under the present federal
announcement statute fail for the most part to shed light on the
question. t The Court squarely considered Section 3109 requirements for
the first time in 1958, in Viller v. United States?5 In that case, the trial
court refused to suppress certain narcotics following a forceful entry by
officers who had announced: "Police!" but had failed to state their
purpose. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated: "The requirement of
prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is
deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging
application." 3 Similarly Justice Brennan, dissenting in Ker v.
California,3 7 postulated that fundamental liberty required protection
from unannounced police intrusions. But the court has only twice
specified the reasons behind these general statements of principle. The
rule is said to be intended to prevent embarrassing circumstances" and
(1969) (Hunter, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1968) (court
apparently would require notice at both the screen and weather doors).
32. 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (1603): "for the law without a default in owner abhors the destruction
or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and
inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of
the process, of which, it is to be presumed that he would obey it. . ."; cf. Aga Kurboolie Mahomed
v. The Queen, 4 Moore P.C. 239,247, 13 Eng. Rep. 293,296 (K.B. 1843).
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190 (1876).
34. Compare Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) with Wong Sun. v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963).
35. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
36. Id. at 313.
37. 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963).
38. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,459-61 (1948) (concurring opinion),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss2/6
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mistaken assaults by fearful householders believing the officer to be a
prowler. 39 Otherwise, the courts have not yet explained what
fundamental infringement occurs when an officer quietly gains entry to a
place that he is, by warrant or on probable cause, entitled to enter.40
A logical explanation incorporating these varying expressions of
rationale seems difficult. For example, if the fundamental freedom is an
absolute right of privacy t it is the entry and not the failure to announce
which constitutes the basic infringement and would protect entries
through open doorways. If the fundamental freedom is a more limited
right to be informed prior to an invasion by the police,'2 it is again
inexplicable why the rule does not apply to an entry through an open
window. If the freedom is the right to be protected against embarassing
encounters, 3 it is strange that calls of "Police!" and "Open up!" are
not sufficient to put the occupant on guard.' Finally, if the right of the
individual is to be free from unnecessary property damage,45 there is no
reason for condemning silent entry through a closed but unlocked door.4
What does seem apparent, from the uneven and often illogical
application of common law announcement standards, is that the rule
serves primarily as a slight limitation47 on the power of the police" rather
than as an important protection of citizen's rights.
39 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,313 n. 12 (1958).
40 - . [N lo basic constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting
to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would, had he complied. , People v.
Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301,294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
41 See Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
42 Compare Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965) with Sabbath v. United
States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Wilgus, Arrest without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 798, 804-05
(1924)
43 McDonald v. United States. 335 U.S. 451,460-61 (1948) (concurring opinion).
44. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958)
45 Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, II E.R.C. 629,77 Eng. Rep. 194,196 (K.B. 1603).
46 See Sabbath v United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); People v. Rosales, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1,437
P 2d489 (1968).
47 "The burden of making an express announcement is certainly slight." Miller v. United
States. 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
48 "'What a privilege will be allowed to sheriffs' officers if they are permitted to effect their
search by violence, without making that demand which possibly will be complied with, and
consequently violence will be rendered unnecessary." Ratcliffv. Burton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 223,230, 127
: ng Rep 123, 127 (1802). See also Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 101:
I sometimes think that judges and lawyers often forget that the Anglo-American system of
criminal law is designed to reduce police control and increase judicial control. . . . The theory of
our system is that the interest of society in convicting the guilty does not justify the use of force...
against the citizen who is presumed innocent." Id. at 110, 112.
The primary difficulty with the announcement decisions is their mechanical exclusion of evidence
Vol. 1970: 205]
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II. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCUSING COMPLIANCE
Section 702 postulates two situations in which the prior
announcement requirement could be dispensed with: likely destruction
or disposal of evidence and danger to the life of an officer or of another.
At common law at least five major exceptions were recognized which
would excuse prior notice:49 increased peril to the officer, 0 or to persons
inside the dwelling or curtilage;1 destruction or disposal of evidence; 2
increased possibility of escape; 3 and, hot pursuit.54 Although not
contained within the usual statutory language55 courts have nevertheless
found these exceptions applicable to relieve compliance with the statutes.
The United States Supreme Court has, on four occasions, indicated
that announcement before forceful entry may be required by the Fourth
Amendment;" but the court has also suggested that each of the common
seized following a technically improper entry by the police. "[E]xclusion should surely not be
demanded where the officer did not know and had no reason to know that in some minor
technicality he was violating a rule." Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUNI. L. REV. 62, 77
(1966).
49. See generally BLAKEY at 500-05.
50. E.g., Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (the leading American case); Gilbert v. United States,
366 F.2d 923, 931 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1966); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301,
294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39-40 (1963).
Contra United States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964). Compliance with the announcement
rule was fatal to one officer. See Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396,95 N.E. 868 (1911).
51. Henderson v. State, 235 Ind. 132, 131 N.E.2d 326 (1955); see People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d
301,294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956), Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
52. E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Dagampat v. United States, 352 F.2d 245 (Cir.
1965); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956). See
generally BLAKEY, at 516.
53. People v. Russell, 223 Cal. App.2d 733, 36 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1963).
54. Hadley v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888 (Ind.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1968). People v. Gilbert,
63 Cal.2d 690, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909,408 P.2d 365 (1965); see Vanella v. United States, 371 F.2d 50
(9th Cir., cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1966).
55. See text accompanying n.8, supra.
56. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); cf.
Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957); Accarino
v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
In each of these decisions, however, there was a prior notice statute regulating the method of
execution by the police, and the Court was not required to articulate any specific standard of
conduct required under the Constitution apart from the statute before it. Although the majority
opinion in Ker, supra, is unclear, it can be strongly argued that the decision held that the restrictions
on unannounced entries by federal officers result from the statute, not the Fourth Amendment, and
that those restrictions are not, therefore, apposite "for state prosecutions where admissibility is
governed by constitutional standards." Id. at 39. Cf. Sabbath v. United States 391 U.S. 585, 591,
n. 8 (1968).
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law exceptions would apply to any constitutionally-mandated rule of
prior announcement. 7 While the Supreme Court has not yet been
presented with a case raising a sufficient exigency under federal
standards, lower federal and state court opinions have frequently applied
the exceptions to sustain the legality of unannounced intrusions to
searchg With this background, the enactment of the "easy disposal"
and "immediate peril" exceptions by Congress in Section 702, linked
with the requirement that probable cause for the exigency be shown to a
judge or magistrate, probably will sustain the statute against
constitutional challenge'
Thus, the effectiveness of Section 702 in the enforcement of drug laws
will hinge not on the constitutionality of the statute, but rather on what
evidentiary showing the courts will require to constitute "probable
cause." To that end, prior decisions interpreting the common law
exceptions will probably become a judicial springboard for interpreting
the -no-knock" statute.
The common law development in the United States of the "increased
peril" exception, as first announced in Read v. Case,." contemplated
some actual knowledge that a suspect was armed and dangerous. Several
recent California decisions have indicated, however, that an offender's
past criminal record, if known, might suffice.6 t Only rarely has a court
ventured to suggest that a general course of conduct by a particular class
of lawbreakers, can raise a presumption of exigency . 2 The crucial
57 See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); and Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
58. Eg, United States v. Aldrete, 414 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Harris, 391
FId 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1968); People v. Russell, 223 Cal. App.2d 733, 36 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1963);
Henderson v. State, 235 Ind. 132, 131 N.E.2d 326 (1955). Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 471 (1963) did
sustain the validity of a "disposal" exception under the Fourth Amendment as applied by the
California Supreme Court under the California statute.
59 The Court of Appeals of New York in People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659,
cert denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1965), sustained the constitutionality of a special warrant statute which
permitted waiver of announcement requirements terms similar to those of § 702. The New York
statute allows a magistrate to issue a special warrant excusing announcement compliance "...
only upon proof under oath, to his satisfaction, that the property sought may be easily and quickly
destroyed or disposed of, or that danger to the life or limb of the officer, or another may result, if
such notice were to be given." N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 799 (MeKinney 1970 Supp.). See
Comment, The Right to Privacy and New York's Rule of No-Announcement, 31 ALBANY L. REV.
88 (1967).
60 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
61 E g, People v. Potter, 144 Cal. App.2d 350, 300 P.2d 889 (1956).
62 See People v. Manriquez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160 (1965). Contra People v. Rosales, 66 Cal.
Rptr 1, 437 P2d 489 (1968).
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question under Section 702 is whether a showing of general experience
and knowledge that narcotics and other drugs in small quantities can be,
and often are, easily destroyed on short notice, will be considered
sufficient to support the issuance of the special warrant. If so, the
practical result under the statute would be an automatic authorization
for specially warranted, unannounced entries in all drug searches. If not,
then the burden on the police of presenting evidence sufficient to raise an
inference of probable cause before a raid may be impossible.13
The decisions under current statutes, as might be expected, are in
conflict. In People v. Gastelo,6' the Attorney General of California
argued that unannounced, forcible entry to execute a search warrant is
always reasonable in narcotics cases, on the ground that narcotics
violators normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable
evidence quickly at the first sign of an officer's presence. Rejecting this
argument, the California Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Traynor stated: "Neither this court nor the United States Supreme
Court has held that unannounced forcible entries may be authorized by a
blanket rule based on the type of crime or evidence involved."" Agreeing
with that statement, the Ninth Circuit in 1967 held that it would excuse
compliance with Section 3109, in accordance with common law
exceptions, only when the specific circumstances known to the officer at
the time of the entry demonstrated an exigency." That reasoning
narrows considerably the "disposal of evidence" exception. For
example, if the officer has approached a door unnoticed, any noises such
as sudden movements away from the door are ambiguous and
meaningless unless coupled with the assumptions that the occupants may
have seen him and that they would more likely than not destroy evidence
if a police officer were approaching. Even if the officer entertains both
presumptions, his entry without notice would not be acceptable under
63. See text at nn.65-66 infra.
64. 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706 (1967).
65. Id. at 708.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always be made to justify any kind
of police action tending to disturb the security of the people in their homes. Unannounced
forcible entry is in itself a serious disturbance of that security and cannot be justified on a
blanket basis. Otherwise the constitutional test of reasonableness would turn only on
practical expediency, and the amendment's primary safeguard-the requirement of
particularity-would be lost. Just as the police must have sufficiently particular reasons to
enter at all, so must they have some particular reason to enter in the manner chosen.
Id. at 708.
66. Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1967).
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Section 3109!1 The officer must be aware of some actualJacts at the
time of execution which would lead him reasonably to believe that the
occupants were aware of his presence or knew that he was coming;15 only
then could an exigency reasonably be assumed. In reality, the occupants
will normally become aware of an officer's presence only if he announces
himself. Therefore, the most that the Ninth Circuit's ruling can mean is
that if the officer hears or otherwise senses suspicious activities after he
announces, he need not wait a lengthy period for a refusal of
admittance!' The problem with this result is obvious: it still guarantees
in all but the most unusual of circumstances an advance alert and some
delay.
On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals, deciding People
v. DeLago70 under a warrant statute which waives prior notice in a
manner not unlike Section 702, 7 held that the issuing judges may take
judicial notice that gambling contraband can be easily destroyed if an
advance notice of entry by police is given. This noticed fact was in turn
considered sufficient to raise an inference that gambling paraphernalia
sought under the specific warrant would in all likelihood be destroyed if
notice were given. This type of reasoning would apparently sanction a
priori the issuance of a warrant excusing notice compliance in all
gambling and afortiori narcotics cases, at least when the nature of the
contraband sought is known. This construction is perhaps closer to
the intent of the Senate in its passage of Section 702 than to the
California court's instruction. The question is whether the Supreme
Court would approve use of that series of presumptions to find probable
cause to invoke Section 702, either under the Fourth Amendment or as a
matter of general construction.
The Court has, on at least one occasion, sustained an invasion of
privacy based on suspicion short of probable cause by taking what
Kenneth Culp Davis calls legislative judicial notice of a general course of
conduct on the part of lawbreakers as a class. In Terry v. Ohio72 an
experienced officer observed the activities of several men, which, in light
67. See, e.g United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555,557 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
68 People v. Rosales, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d489,493 (1968); cf. Kerv. California, 374 U.S.
23(1963)
69 See McClure v. United States, 332 F.2d 19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 945 (1964)
(heard footsteps apparently moving away from the doorway after being observed by an occupant
and having made express announcement of identity-delay for refusal of admittance excused).
70 16N.Y.2d289,213 N.E.2d659 (1965).
71 Seenote61supra.
72 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of his experience, he interpreted as preparation for a daytime robbery. In
the course of an investigative encounter with the men, the officer
"frisked" for concealed weapons; a pistol was in fact uncovered, and the
Court affirmed the subsequent conviction for illegal possession of the
firearm. The majority found the "frisk" conducted pursuant to the
officer's reasonable concern for his safety, based on his suspicion (rather
than probable cause) that the men were contemplating a daytime
robbery, ". . . which it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to
involve the use of weapons. . ."I Thus, the presumption of "armed and
dangerous" followed from the inherent nature of the offense suspected.
Section 702 does expressly authorize the magistrate to excuse prior
notice when there is "probable cause to believe that . . . the giving of
such notice will immediately endanger the life or safety of the executing
officer or of another person. . . ." If the Terry reasoning were to be
applied under this exception, the courts would construe the "probable
cause" as meaning something less than probable cause-a result
altogether unlikely to occur. Furthermore, it is clearly possible that the
Court will be unwilling, without express Congressional direction, to
extend this type of judicial notice to destruction of evidence in forceful
entry situations, as contrasted with street encounters. Congress could
merely have required a showing that the property sought could be easily
destroyed (as the New York statute requires, instead of the actual
language of Section 702: ". . . will be easily destroyed. . ."). Thus the
Court would be forced to confront directly the Fourth Amendment issue
of entry without notice. As passed by the Senate, however, Section 702
will provide law officers greater leverage in drug searches only if the
courts can be persuaded to adopt a liberal interpretation of the bill's
probable cause requirement.
III. CONCLUSION
S. 3246, Section 702, is in large measure a selective statutory
enactment of the common law exceptions excusing notice before a
forceful entry. As a result, disputes over the construction and meaning of
the "no-knock" section will, for the most part, only continue arguments
which remain unsettled under Section 3109 and other codifications of the
common law. To this extent, the publicity the bill has received seems
misplaced. If the statute is to expand the powers of forceful entry by the
police, it must accomplish this through case law development, which is
exactly what has been occuring under the present statutes.
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Perhaps the statute, in its attempt to remove supposed obstacles to
effective police investigations, will backfire. For example, the enactment
of specific exceptions for prior notice in narcotics searches may be
interpreted as an implied repeal of the other common law exceptions.
This would mean that police would always be required to appear before
a magistrate for a special warrant before any entry without notice.
Moreover, if "probable cause" under Section 702 requires more than
judicial notice of general conduct by suspects in possession of drugs, then
the police may find themselves unable to produce any evidence-by
observation of the suspect or otherwise-which would raise an inference
that the suspect will, in fact, destroy the goods. As a result, the "no-
knock" section would require prior notice with fewer exceptions than
presently permitted. Furthermore, Section 702, as formulated by the
Senate, may not avoid the technical and restrictive interpretations that
have beset current federal and state statutes requiring announcement. As
a practical matter, Section 702 may accomplish little more than to
educate Congress in the difficulties of formulating both fair and effective
procedures for law enforcement.
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